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RACIAL DISTINCTIONS IN MEDICINE*
Charles Sullivan **
Cognitive dissonance is a wonderful thing.1
For years, there has been intense concern about racial discrimination in
health care -- ranging from the infamous Tuskegee study to questions
of equal access to medical care. In the process, enormous amounts of
data have been generated about the health and treatment of various
segments of the American population, and a range of explanations has
been offered for racial or ethnic disparities. These include old-
fashioned bias, less culpable but perhaps more ingrained insensitivity to
cultural differences, socio-economic factors, and, in some cases,
resistance of racial, ethnic or national origin groups to medical
interventions.
In the shadow of efforts to explain, and hopefully, ameliorate
racial disparities, there is an increasing question whether race should be
taken into account in some medical decisions. This question necessarily
arises from an inquiry into the causes of racial disparities - put simply,
are the races genetically different (as opposed to different culturally or
socio-economically) in ways that are relevant to health care?
Most of those concerned with equal access proceed (explicitly or
implicitly) under what might be called the "equality" hypothesis - all
* Reprinted with permission from the HeLLP Newsletter, Fall 2001.
*0 Charles A. Sullivan is a professor of law at Seton Hall Law School, LLB Harvard
University;, LL.M. New York University Law School.
'Cognitive dissonance, originating in LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNnIVE
DISSONANCE (1957), argues that humans try to develop consistent belief systems, and that
holding inconsistent beliefs - dissonance - leads to discomfort, which in turn leads to efforts,
often not fully conscious, to reconcile belief systems. Sometimes that "reconciliation" requires
ignoring what would otherwise be plain inconsistencies.
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races are the same in almost any way that would matter to health care;
current racial differences result from what might be called social
construction. That is, the genetic potential for good health for blacks
and whites is presumed to be the same. Variations are explained by
factors which are exogenous to health per se - economic disparities in
access to health care, discrimination by health care providers, cultural
differences among subject populations which may result in less healthy
lifestyles, and/or less reliance on traditional medical care.2
Presumably, elimination of these conditions -- whether by subsidy,
legislation, or education -- would equalize health outcomes.
There is, however, a "difference" model: blacks are different from
whites, such that identical treatment is neither necessary nor
appropriate. The difference model could be expressed in a weak form,
which is not so different from the equality model. The weak form
would merely posit that historical, cultural, and economic factors result
in racial groups being, at this point in time, statistically different, even
if underlying biology is the same. Under this approach, it may be
appropriate to take race into account in various decisions not because
there is anything biological involved but because race is a useful proxy
for other factors that are relevant to decision making.
The strong form of the difference model is more interesting, and
more threatening: it posits that races are different genetically, which
differences need to be taken into account in at least some medical
decision making.
Analyzing these two models can be extremely complex, as often
true of attempts to distinguish between genetic and environmental
causes of phenotypes. For example, a recent article by Professor
Vernellia Randall on cigarette smoking among blacks - obviously an
important "lifestyle" influence on health -- states that they have greater
nicotine dependence than whites "despite the fact that African-
Americans start later in life and smoke fewer cigarettes." 3 She suggests
that this greater dependence may be attributable to the brands African
Americans tend to smoke (which in turn might be explained by targeted
2A recent study in the NEW ENGLAND JouRNAL OF MEDICINE confirmed disparities in
treatment of whites and blacks in terms of whether cardiac catheterization was undertaken, but
found no difference in terms of the race of the treating physician.3Vemellia R. Randall, Smoking, the African-American Community, and the Proposed
National Tobacco Settlement, 29 U. TOL. L. Rnv. 677, 688 (1998).
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marketing by cigarette companies), but acknowledges that the causes
are still to be determined by biomedical research.
Given the tragic history of racism in this country, including
"scientific racism" and such disgraceful episodes in modem medicine
as Tuskegee, either the weak or strong forms of the difference model
need to be addressed carefully. But recent developments suggest that
there is an increasing assumption that there are genetic differences that
should, at least occasionally, be taken into account.
Some manifestations of this are prime examples of cognitive
dissonance. For example, the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993
mandates the inclusion of minorities (as well as women) in clinical
trials.4 The underlying predicate of this must be that minorities are
genetically different from whites. Otherwise, there is little point to the
inclusion and, given the lack of trust by minority group members,
especially African Americans, in medical experimentation, it is not
clear why the government should encourage such participation.5 But
this is not directly acknowledged in the Act of by the Office of
Minority Health of HHS, nor is there generally federal government
recognition of possible genetic racial differences.
The most explicit and dramatic manifestation of possible genetic
racial difference was the announcement earlier this year of clinical
trials for a drug "designed exclusively for African Americans."6
According to the New York Times, the trials have been authorized by
the FDA and sponsored not only by the drug's manufacturer,
NitroMed, Inc., but also by the Association of Black Cardiologists,
described as a group representing 500 black heart specialists.
NitroMed's clinical trial vividly illustrates the intersection of the
two models. There is no doubt about the race gap in heart disease:
blacks are far more likely than whites to die from this condition. 7
442 U.S.C.S. § 289a-2 (2001). See also Why African Americans May Not Be
Participating in Clinical Trials, JAMA, Oct. 1996.
Id.
6Week in Review, 4-1, Sunday, May 13, 2001.7See Lance E. Becker, et al, Racial Differences in the Incidence of Cardiac Arrest and
Subsequent Survival, 329 NmV ENG. J. MED. 600-606 (1993). There are numerous other "racial
gaps" in health conditions. See generally, John A. Rich, The Health ofAfrican American Men,
569 ArNNALs AM. AcAD. PaL. & SOC. SC. 149 (2000).
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Further, there seems to be reason to believe that blacks do not react as
well as whites to standard hypertension drugs.
8
An equality model would conclude that the racial gap is explained by
dietary or lifestyle habits, as to which education is the solution, or
results from unequal access to health care, or less aggressive treatment
by the medical profession. There are, in fact, ongoing studies trying to
identify more precisely the causes of the racial gap. Equality theorists
would have a harder time dealing with the evidence that blacks do not
respond as well as whites to current drugs, but that, too, might be
explainable by lifestyle factors, including a lower degree of trust among
African Americans (and, therefore, perhaps less compliance with
prescribed regimens). For a difference theorist, however, the NitroMed
clinical trial is a straightforward reaction to the racial gap in heart
disease, and strongly indicated by scientific evidence that current drugs
are less effective for African Americans. This approach would seek to
solve a documented problem, and looks upon resistance to it as
misguided at best and its own kind of racism at worst.
But the resistance to such explicit recognition of possible racial
differences is fierce. The Times article was headlined, "Shouldn't a Pill
be Colorblind?," and recounted critics who questioned the whole
concept of race as scientifically meaningless. If there is no such thing
as a "black" race, in genetic terms, how can a drug be designed for
African Americans? For example, an editorial in the New England
Journal of Medicine, entitled "Racial Profiling in Medical Research,"
attacked a study finding a particular drug as more effective in whites
than blacks in treating left ventricular dysfunction.
9
Where do we go from here? Or, more precisely, where does the
law go from here? The NitroMed study was authorized by the FDA.
Should it have been? Is this approval of race discrimination? If the
NitroMed drug is ultimately approved, and doctors prescribe it to their
African Americans and not to their white patients, is this problematic?
This is scarcely an academic question in light of FDA approval of
8Compare DV Exner, Lesser Response to Angiotensim-Converting -Enzyme-Inhibitor
Therapy in Black as Compared with White Patients with Left Ventrical Dysfunction, 344 Nmv
ENGL. J. MED. 1351-57 (2001) with Clyde W. Yancy, and 19 others, Race and Response to
Adrenergic Blockade with Carvedilol in Patients with Chronic Heart Failure, 344 NEnv ENG. J.
MED. 1358-65 (2001). See generally Shades ofDoubt and Fears of Bias in the Doctor's Office,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 25, 2001, A16.
9Racial Profiling in Medical Research, 344 Nmv ENG. J. MED. 1392-93 (2001).
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drugs which are clearly going to be marketed as more effective for
blacks, with FDA approval of, or at least acquiescence in, such
marketing."
And, lest we think that there is no harm with an additional drug
which appears to do some good for some individuals, recall that most
drugs have potential adverse side-effects. Treating an African
American with a designer drug is not risk free.
Further, there is the risk that, if racial differences become
acceptable bases for treatment in some instances, there will be a
tendency to implement more and more race-based treatments. For
example, a British team recently reported that black patients required
much more of an antirejection drug after renal transplants than did their
white counterparts. 1 The study was based on very few patients, but
could lead doctors to overprescribe medications to their African
American patients.
If the history of discrimination law teaches us anything, it is that
"common sense" notions of racial differences are often wholly
inaccurate or at least grossly overstated stereotypes, and that even real
differences between the races are rarely justifications for treating one
worse than another. On the other hand, in the age of the Human
Genome Project, it would be foolhardy to restrict science where
genetics does play a role. And it is not hard to identify at least a few
areas where race-linked genetic background is critical. The two most
common examples are Tay-Sachs, which afflicts those with an Eastern
European Jewish lineage and sickle-cell anemia, which afflicts African
Americans.
12
Of course, it is a long step from agreeing that a few conditions are
race-related to concluding that, genetically, race-linked genes have an
appreciable impact on human health. First, many scientists reject the
10The drug at issue is Travatan, which is used to treat glaucoma. Msnbc.com, March 16,
(citation omitted)
"Peter A. Andres, et al., Racial Variation in Dosage Requirements of Tacrolimus, Letter
to the Editor, THE LANCET, Nov. 23, 1996, 348 (9039): 1446,
12Some may question whether these are "race" linked at all. Each condition is a genetic
condition arising from a gene pool whose members are substantially all members of a particular
group. Not all African Americans are afflicted with the sickle-cell trait, and not all Jews have
Tay-Sachs. Nevertheless, substantially all of those with the trait in question belong to these
respective groups. To a large extent, approaching this question takes us back to the fundamental
issue of what constitutes a "race."
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whole concept of race, claiming that the genetic differences between
members of a given race are often greater than the genetic differences
between a given member of one race and a given member of the other.
Secondly, if race makes sense in some terms, it may not make sense in
America, where there has been considerable mixing of previously
distinct gene pools. Indeed, the United States census defines race not
scientifically but in terms of self-identification. While there are valid
political reasons to do so, it scarcely advances a scientific approach to
race in medicine. Finally, there are risks in pursuing this inquiry. Much
"scientific" work around the turn of the twentieth century was devoted
to racial differences, with the (often-acknowledged) goal of proving the
superiority of the white race. Nor has this effort ended, as the recent
publication of The Bell Curve attests.
Nevertheless, as the Times article vividly illustrates, the topic of
genetic differences is still with us. Perhaps as importantly, the very
predicate of the clinical trial of a new heart drug -- the greater risk
African Americans face of heart disease -- suggests that race-based
medicine must be considered: whether or not differences in African
Americans and whites can be traced to nature or nurture, the very
differences between the populations suggest that race may be a useful
factor in identifying and perhaps treating certain conditions. Nor are
the potential benefits of the use of race limited to African Americans.
13
From a legal standpoint, the constraints on race differentiation are
limited. The first question is whether any racial distinctions constitute
"discrimination" under governing principles. Even if the answer is yes,
whether the conduct at issue is actionable is problematic. There are
three major sources of federal rights, which collectively leave large
areas untouched. Obviously, the Equal Protection Clause limits
discrimination by the government, and may implicate action by the
FDA and decisions by public hospitals or research facilities. Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also can be brought to bear on race
discrimination in federally-funded programs, which potentially might
have a huge impact because of the dominance of Medicare and
Medicaid. Finally, 42 U.S.C § 1981, which bars racial discrimination in
13Lisa Ikemoto, The Fuzzy Logic of Race and Gender in the Mismeasure of Asian
American Women's Health Issues, 65 U. CINc. L, REv. 799, 801 (1997) (criticizing "the
contradiction between using race and gender to measure health care, but doing so in a way that
ignores the social categories in which these categories operate").
['Vol. 5: 249
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contracts even among private individuals, might have some application,
although that statute has rarely been invoked in the health care setting,
except to challenge discriminatory denials of medical staff privileges.
The obvious question is to what extent, if any, these legal tools
should be brought to bear on racial distinctions in health. Any such
analysis must address at least five potential uses of race. In ascending
order of difficulty, these are (1) race-focused statistical studies; (2)
race-related outreach; (3) race-based clinical trials; (4) race-based
clinical screening; and (5) race-based treatment.
It may be time to begin a hard look at each of these areas, and to
resolve the cognitive dissonance race and science generates by a
conscious and rational approach instead of the denial that has
characterized discussions of this subject.
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